Case C‑414/16
Vera Egenberger
v
Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht)
(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 2000/78/CE — Equal treatment — Difference of treatment on grounds of religion or belief — Occupational activities within churches and other organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief — Religion or belief constituting a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos — Concept — Nature and context of the activities — Article 17 TFEU — Articles 10, 21 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union)
Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 17 April 2018
Social policy—Equal treatment in employment and occupation—Directive 2000/78—Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief—Rejection of an application for employment by a church or other organisation based on religion or belief—Rejection on grounds of religion or belief constituting a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement having regard to the ethos of the organisation—Obligation of Member States to provide for effective judicial review
(Art. 17 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 10 and 47; Council Directive 2000/78, Arts 4(2), 9 and 10)
Social policy—Equal treatment in employment and occupation—Directive 2000/78—Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief—Concept of genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement—Scope—Compliance with the principle of proportionality
(Council Directive 2000/78, Art. 4(2))
European Union law—Principles—Equal treatment—Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief—Coordination with Directive 2000/78—Whether Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union may be relied on—Dispute between two individuals—Obligations and powers of the national courts—Interpretation of national legislation in conformity with EU law—Limits—Interpretation contra legem of national law—Obligation to disapply any national provision contrary to EU law
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 21 and 47; Council Directive 2000/78, Arts 1 and 4 (2))
Article 4(2) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, read in conjunction with Articles 9 and 10 of the directive and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that, where a church or other organisation whose ethos is based on religion or belief asserts, in support of an act or decision such as the rejection of an application for employment with it, that by reason of the nature of the activities concerned or the context in which the activities are to be carried out, religion constitutes a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the ethos of the church or organisation, it must be possible for such an assertion to be the subject, if need be, of effective judicial review by which it can be ensured that the criteria set out in Article 4(2) of that directive are satisfied in the particular case.
While Directive 2000/78 aims to protect the fundamental right of workers not to be discriminated against on grounds of their religion or belief, the fact remains that, by means of Article 4(2), that directive also aims to take into account the right of autonomy of churches and other public or private organisations whose ethos is based on religion or belief, as recognised by Article 17 TFEU and Article 10 of the Charter, which corresponds to Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 1950.
The objective of Article 4 (2) of Directive 2000/78 is thus to ensure a fair balance between the right of autonomy of churches and other organisations whose ethos is based on religion or belief, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the right of workers, inter alia when they are being recruited, not to be discriminated against on grounds of religion or belief, in situations where those rights may clash.
To that end, that provision sets out the criteria to be taken into account in the balancing exercise which must be performed in order to ensure a fair balance between those competing fundamental rights.
In the event of a dispute, however, it must be possible for the balancing exercise to be the subject if need be of review by an independent authority, and ultimately by a national court.
Article 17 TFEU expresses the neutrality of the European Union towards the organisation by the Member States of their relations with churches and religious associations and communities. On the other hand, that article is not such as to exempt compliance with the criteria set out in Article 4 (2) of Directive 2000/78 from effective judicial review.
(see paras 50-53, 58, 59, operative part 1)
Article 4 (2) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as meaning that the genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement it refers to is a requirement that is necessary and objectively dictated, having regard to the ethos of the church or organisation concerned, by the nature of the occupational activity concerned or the circumstances in which it is carried out, and cannot cover considerations which have no connection with that ethos or with the right of autonomy of the church or organisation. That requirement must comply with the principle of proportionality.
As regards the interpretation of the concept of ‘genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement’ in Article 4 (2) of Directive 2000/78, it follows expressly from that provision that it is by reference to the ‘nature’ of the activities concerned or the ‘context’ in which they are carried out that religion or belief may constitute such an occupational requirement.
Thus the lawfulness from the point of view of that provision of a difference of treatment on grounds of religion or belief depends on the objectively verifiable existence of a direct link between the occupational requirement imposed by the employer and the activity concerned. Such a link may follow either from the nature of the activity, for example where it involves taking part in the determination of the ethos of the church or organisation in question or contributing to its mission of proclamation, or else from the circumstances in which the activity is to be carried out, such as the need to ensure a credible presentation of the church or organisation to the outside world.
Furthermore, the occupational requirement must, as required by Article 4 (2) of Directive 2000/78, be ‘genuine, legitimate and justified’, having regard to the ethos of the church or organisation. Although in principle, as stated in paragraph 61 above, it is not for the national courts to rule on the ethos as such on which the purported occupational requirement is founded, they are nevertheless called on to decide on a case-by-case basis whether those three criteria are satisfied from the point of view of that ethos.
With respect to those criteria, it should be stated, first, as regards the ‘genuine’ nature of the requirement, that the use of that adjective means that, in the mind of the EU legislature, professing the religion or belief on which the ethos of the church or organisation is founded must appear necessary because of the importance of the occupational activity in question for the manifestation of that ethos or the exercise by the church or organisation of its right of autonomy.
Secondly, as regards the ‘legitimate’ nature of the requirement, the use of that term shows that the EU legislature wished to ensure that the requirement of professing the religion or belief on which the ethos of the church or organisation is founded is not used to pursue an aim that has no connection with that ethos or with the exercise by the church or organisation of its right of autonomy.
Thirdly, as regards the ‘justified’ nature of the requirement, that term implies not only that compliance with the criteria in Article 4 (2) of Directive 2000/78 can be reviewed by a national court, but also that the church or organisation imposing the requirement is obliged to show, in the light of the factual circumstances of the case, that the supposed risk of causing harm to its ethos or to its right of autonomy is probable and substantial, so that imposing such a requirement is indeed necessary.
(see paras 62-67, 69, operative part 2)
A national court hearing a dispute between two individuals is obliged, where it is not possible for it to interpret the applicable national law in conformity with Article 4 (2) of Directive 2000/78, to ensure within its jurisdiction the judicial protection deriving for individuals from Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and to guarantee the full effectiveness of those articles by disapplying if need be any contrary provision of national law.
It must be recalled that it is for the national courts, taking into account the whole body of rules of national law and applying methods of interpretation recognised by that law, to decide whether and to what extent a national provision such as Paragraph 9(1) of the AGG can be interpreted in conformity with Article 4 (2) of Directive 2000/78, without having recourse to an interpretation contra legem of the national provision (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraphs 31 and 32 and the case-law cited).
In the event that it is impossible to interpret the national provision at issue in the main proceedings in conformity with EU law, it must be pointed out, first, that Directive 2000/78 does not itself establish the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation, which originates in various international instruments and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, but has the sole purpose of laying down, in that field, a general framework for combating discrimination on various grounds, including religion and belief, as may be seen from its title and from Article 1 (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 May 2011, Römer, C‑147/08, EU:C:2011:286, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
The prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is mandatory as a general principle of EU law. That prohibition, which is laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such in disputes between them in a field covered by EU law (see, with respect to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, judgment of 15 January 2014, Association de médiation sociale, C‑176/12, EU:C:2014:2, paragraph 47).
As regards its mandatory effect, Article 21 of the Charter is no different, in principle, from the various provisions of the founding Treaties prohibiting discrimination on various grounds, even where the discrimination derives from contracts between individuals (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 April 1976, Defrenne, 43/75, EU:C:1976:56, paragraph 39; of 6 June 2000, Angonese, C‑281/98, EU:C:2000:296, paragraphs 33 to 36; of 3 October 2000, Ferlini, C‑411/98, EU:C:2000:530, paragraph 50; and of 11 December 2007, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union, C‑438/05, EU:C:2007:772, paragraphs 57 to 61).
Secondly, it must be pointed out that, like Article 21 of the Charter, Article 47 of the Charter on the right to effective judicial protection is sufficient in itself and does not need to be made more specific by provisions of EU or national law to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such.
Consequently, the national court would be required, if necessary, to ensure within its jurisdiction the judicial protection for individuals flowing from Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter, and to guarantee the full effectiveness of those articles by disapplying if need be any contrary provision of national law.
(see paras 71, 75-79, 82, operative part 3)