Case C‑685/15
Online Games Handels GmbH and Others
v
Landespolizeidirektion Oberösterreich
(Request for a preliminary rulingfrom the Landesverwaltungsgericht Oberösterreich)
(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 49 TFEU — Freedom of establishment — Article 56 TFEU — Freedom to provide services — Games of chance — Restrictive legislation of a Member State — Penal administrative sanctions — Overriding reasons in the public interest — Proportionality — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 47 — Right to effective judicial protection — National legislation laying down the requirement for the court to examine of its own motion the facts of the case before it in the context of the prosecution of administrative offences — Compliance)
Summary — Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 14 June 2017
Fundamental rights—Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union—Scope—Implementation of EU law—National legislation laying down a measure derogating from a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty FEU—Included
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51(1))
Freedom of establishment—Freedom to provide services—Restrictions—Betting and gaming—Determination by the national court of compliance with EU law of national legislation restricting the exercise of a fundamental freedom of the European Union—Right to effective judicial protection—Obligation on the court hearing the case, in the context of examining the existence of administrative offences, to examine of its own motion the facts of the case—Lawfulness—Condition
(Arts 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47)
The first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter provides that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article. In addition, Article 19 (1) TEU requires Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection, within the meaning in particular of Article 47 of the Charter, in the fields covered by EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2016, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK, C‑243/15, EU:C:2016:838, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). The scope of Article 47 of the Charter, in so far as the action of the Member States is concerned, is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States when they are implementing EU law. That provision confirms the Court’s settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgment of 8 November 2016, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK, C‑243/15, EU:C:2016:838, paragraph 51). As was noted by the Advocate General in point 30 of her Opinion, where a Member State enacts a measure that derogates from a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the FEU Treaty, such as the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services, that measure falls within the scope of EU law.
(see paras 54-57)
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, as interpreted in particular by the judgment of 30 April 2014, Pfleger and Others (C‑390/12, EU:C:2014:281), read in light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding a national procedural system according to which, in administrative offence proceedings, the court called upon to rule on the compliance with EU law of legislation restricting the exercise of a fundamental freedom of the European Union, such as the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services within the European Union, is required to examine of its own motion the facts of the case before it in the context of examining whether administrative offences arise, provided that such a system does not have the consequence that that court is required to substitute itself for the competent authorities of the Member State concerned, whose task it is to provide the evidence necessary to enable that court to determine whether that restriction is justified.
In the present case, it follows from the provisions of national law referred to in paragraphs 3 to 5 and 12 to 20 of the present judgment that the decisions of the administrative authorities may be subject to an action for illegality before the administrative courts, those courts ruling on the substance of those actions. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the court is required to examine the facts of the case before it within the limits of the case, taking account in the same way of any exonerating and incriminating circumstances. In the context of those proceedings, the administrative authority having imposed the sanction for an administrative offence has the status of a party. On the basis of those elements alone, there is no reason to consider that such a procedural system is such as to give rise to doubts as to the impartiality of the national court, in so far as that court is required to investigate the case before it, not in order to support the prosecution, but to establish the truth.
(see paras 63, 64, 67, operative part)