Case C‑45/15 P
Safa Nicu Sepahan Co.
v
Council of the European Union
(Appeal — Action for damages — Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) — Restrictive measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran — List of persons and entities subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources — Material damage — Non-material damage — Error of assessment in respect of the amount of compensation — None — Cross-appeal — Conditions governing the incurring of the European Union’s non-contractual liability — Obligation to substantiate the restrictive measures — Sufficiently serious breach)
Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 30 May 2017
Appeal—Response—Purpose—Reliance on pleas in law distinct from and independent of those raised in the appeal—Inadmissible
(Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Arts 172, 174, 176 and 178(1) and (3))
Non-contractual liability—Conditions—Unlawfulness—Sufficiently serious breach of EU law—Breach by the Council of the obligation laid down in case-law to establish that restrictive measures adopted in respect of legal or natural persons are well founded—Included
(Art. 340, second para., TFEU)
EU law—Principles—Rights of the defence—Right to effective judicial protection—Restrictive measures—Freezing of funds of certain persons, entities or bodies having regard to the situation in a third country—Obligation to disclose incriminating evidence—Scope
(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47)
Non-contractual liability—Conditions—Actual and certain damage caused by an illegal measure—Non-material damage caused by the adoption and maintenance of restrictive measures—Annulment of the contested act not providing appropriate compensation for non-material damage
(Art. 340, second para., TFEU)
Appeal—Grounds—Inadequate statement of reasons—Criteria used by the General Court to determine the amount of compensation awarded by way of reparation for damage—Judicial review by the Court
Non-contractual liability—Conditions—Unlawfulness—Damage—Causal link—Burden of proof
(Art. 340, second para., TFEU)
Appeal—Grounds—Review by the Court of the assessment of the facts and evidence—Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted—Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the clear sense of the evidence—Need to indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which led to that distortion
(Art. 256(1), second subpara., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 51, first para., and 58, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 168(1)(d))
Non-contractual liability—Conditions—Actual and certain damage—Assessment—Criteria
(Art. 340, second para., TFEU)
Action for annulment—Grounds—Lack of or inadequate statement of reasons—Separate ground from the one concerning substantive legality
(Arts 263 TFEU and 296 TFEU)
Appeal—Grounds—Plea submitted for the first time in the context of the appeal—Inadmissible
(Art. 256(1) TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 58, first para.)
Under Article 174 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, a response is to seek to have the appeal allowed or dismissed, in whole or in part. Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 172 and 176 of those rules, the parties authorised to lodge a response may submit, by a document separate from the response, a cross-appeal which, according to Article 178(1) and the second sentence of Article 178(3) of those rules, must seek to have set aside, in whole or in part, the judgment under appeal on the basis of pleas in law and arguments separate from those relied on in the response. It is apparent from those provisions, read together, that the response may not seek to have the judgment under appeal set aside on the basis of distinct and independent grounds from those raised in the appeal, since such grounds may be raised only as part of a cross-appeal.
(see paras 20)
As regards the establishment of the European Union’s non-contractual liability, a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law that is intended to confer rights on individuals is established where the breach is one that implies that the institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits set on its discretion, the factors to be taken into consideration in that connection being, inter alia, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule breached and the measure of discretion left by that rule to the EU authorities. A breach of EU law will, in any event, clearly be sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite a judgment finding the breach in question to be established, or despite a preliminary ruling or settled case-law of the Court on the matter from which it is clear that the conduct in question constituted a breach.
A breach, over a period of almost three years, of the obligation on the Council to provide, in the event of a challenge, information or evidence substantiating the reasons for the adoption of restrictive measures against a natural or legal person constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. It is clear that such an obligation, which is derived from the case-law relating to asset-freezing measures adopted in the specific context of the fight against international terrorism, applies equally with regard to the adoption of asset-freezing restrictive measures aimed at applying pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran given, in particular, the individual nature of those restrictive measures and the considerable impact they are likely to have on the rights and freedoms of the persons and entities subject to them.
(see paras 30, 31, 39, 40)
See the text of the decision.
(see paras 36, 37)
Whilst the annulment of unlawful restrictive measures is capable of constituting a form of reparation for non-material damage suffered by the person or entity concerned, it does not follow from this that that form of reparation is necessarily sufficient, in every case, to ensure full reparation for such damage.
(see para. 49)
See the text of the decision.
(see paras 50, 51, 103)
See the text of the decision.
(see paras 61, 62)
See the text of the decision.
(see paras 65, 74-76, 84)
The existence of actual and certain damage cannot be considered in the abstract by the EU judicature but must be assessed in relation to the specific facts characterising each particular case in point.
(see para. 79)
See the text of the decision.
(see para. 85)
See the text of the decision.
(see para. 109)